The price of a berth

A berth is supposed to be the beginning of a career. When the conversation starts with how many lakhs a young person must pay to obtain it, the industry has already failed that person.

In conversations with seafarers and people in recruitment, I repeatedly hear of cadets and ratings being asked for Rs 5-6 lakh for a first vessel. That is my experience of those conversations, not a measured national rate or an allegation against a named company. It is enough to make the question worth asking: who is accountable when the promise of a ship becomes a transaction with a middleman?

I run an RPSL company. More compliance means more work and expense for us too. I support stronger oversight, provided it tests the things that protect a seafarer and gives an honest operator a workable route to comply.

The problem has a paper trail

The regulator has described the failures in concrete terms. DGS Order 08 of 2026 records unpaid wages, difficulty arranging repatriation, discrepancies between the vessel in an employment agreement or Form I and the vessel actually joined, and involvement of multiple recruiting agencies. It also records problems with compensation and recognition of sea service. These are regulatory findings, rather than a judgement about every recruitment business. ^[1]

The paperwork matters because it identifies who promised what. A young seafarer can hold a collection of apparently convincing documents and still need to establish whether the recruiter, shipowner and vessel form one genuine employment arrangement.

The Maritime Labour Convention already requires a recruitment system without recruitment or placement charges to the seafarer. Its limited exceptions concern specified personal documents; visa costs are for the shipowner. A payment demanded simply to secure employment does not become acceptable because somebody calls it a service charge. ^[2]

A higher guarantee, a real business test

The 2026 recruitment rules increase the bank-guarantee requirements. The lowest capacity band, up to 50 seafarers, requires Rs 25 lakh; the highest, above 1,000, requires Rs 1 crore. The full table is shown alongside. Existing valid 2016 licensees have a three-year period for the differential guarantee, with an exception when seeking expansion. ^[3]

A guarantee is a contingent financial commitment. Its face value should not be described as a non-refundable government fee or assumed to be an identical cash deposit for every company. Banking terms, collateral and access to credit determine how heavily it bears on a particular business.

That distinction matters to the debate about small operators. A small firm can be competent and responsible. A larger balance sheet does not establish honest recruitment. If good smaller firms leave because finance becomes inaccessible, a policy can reduce competition without proving that it removed fraud.

The useful test is whether the agency can support the commitments it makes: identify its principals, understand the employment arrangement, answer a complaint and help when a seafarer is stranded. Inspections should test that capability through records and actual performance.

Form 1B is part of the change

DGMA Circular 68 of 2026, dated 13 October, sets 15 October for the enhanced RPSL beta module. It provides for a unified licence covering seafarers and applicable non-seafarer or technician categories, and explicitly provides existing RPS agencies access to generate Form 1B. ^[4]

It discontinues fresh separate non-seafarer e-Migrate authorisations under Merchant Shipping Notice 02 of 2018. Existing separately authorised entities, other than existing RPSL holders, are asked to transition within three months of the circular. The circular schedules further digital processes for 1 November; a scheduled rollout should not be confused with verified operation.

This brings applicable deployments into a more unified licensing framework. It does not make every technician a seafarer, or prove that every business using the earlier route behaved improperly. Those distinctions deserve to survive even a strongly worded debate.

Check the RPSL status

An ANCHOR check of the DGS RPSL list on 15 October showed 537 valid RPSLs, 397 invalid RPSLs and 66 temporarily blocked RPSLs. These were the listed statuses on that date. An invalid or blocked status alone is not a finding of fraud. One snapshot cannot explain how far the market has shrunk, or why.

DGS Circular 55 of 2025 warns about unauthorised intermediaries and impersonation. It advises live licence checks and verification of joining documents, including the Application Reference Number and passport details. ^[5] A genuine licence number can still be copied into a false offer. The company behind the offer must confirm it through independently checked contact details.

Measure what reaches the seafarer

A grievance system earns trust through what happens after submission: a traceable case, a clear response, proper escalation and an outcome the person can understand. DGMA Circular 67 of 2026 requires prominent display of its 24-hour grievance information at training institutes and RPSL establishments. ^[6] Visibility is useful; resolution is the measure that follows.

The evidence to look for is practical. Are fewer people paying for jobs? Are ship and contract details matching? Are unpaid wages recovered? Are stranded people brought home sooner? Are complaints resolved fairly, with reasons? Those questions can test improvement without assuming that fewer valid RPSLs mean a cleaner industry.

My support for tighter oversight comes with the same expectation I would place on my own company: the work must be visible in the seafarer's experience. A stronger system should make a first berth safer to accept, and a recruitment promise harder to abandon.